Bank Business Plans and Directors’ Accountability: Where Does Regulatory Compliance End and Corporate Liability Begin?

A Bank’s Business Plan (“BBP”) is not merely a regulatory requirement. It serves as a strategic framework for the bank’s operations and provides a basis for assessing the performance and accountability of its management.
On September 2026, the Financial Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan or “OJK”) enacted OJK Regulation No. 17 of 2026 concerning Commercial Bank Business Plans (“POJK 17/2026”), replacing OJK Regulation No. 5/POJK.03/2016 concerning Bank Business Plans.
Beyond introducing a revised framework for preparing and implementing Business Plans, the regulation raises an important question: does a deviation from an approved Business Plan necessarily indicate a failure by the bank’s directors to discharge their duties?
The answer is: not necessarily. It is important to distinguish between regulatory compliance and directors’ accountability under the applicable corporate law framework.
A Deviation Does Not Necessarily Mean Ineffective Implementation
Article 3 paragraph (2) of POJK 17/2026 establishes that a BBP may still be considered effectively implemented despite a material deviation, provided that the bank has made maximum efforts to achieve the Business Plan and the deviation is accompanied by an adequate and acceptable explanation.
This approach recognises that banks operate in a dynamic business environment, where market conditions, economic developments and regulatory changes may affect the achievement of predetermined targets. Accordingly, the assessment is not limited to whether the bank has achieved its targets, but also considers how it responds when actual performance departs from the approved plan.
A material deviation arising from external circumstances, accompanied by reasonable corrective measures and an adequate explanation, should therefore be distinguished from a deviation resulting from inadequate planning, poor execution or ineffective management.
Importantly, the regulatory test under Article 3 paragraph (2) concerns whether the Business Plan has been effectively implemented for regulatory purposes. It should not be interpreted as an automatic exemption from directors’ responsibilities under the applicable corporate law framework.
Regulatory Compliance vs. Directors’ Liability
For banks established as Indonesian limited liability companies (perseroan terbatas or “PT”), directors’ responsibilities are also governed by Law No. 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies, as amended (“Company Law”).
Under Articles 92 and 97 of the Company Law, directors are responsible for managing the company in its interests and must perform their duties in good faith and with full responsibility. Article 97 paragraphs (3) and (5) further regulate the circumstances in which directors may be held personally liable for losses suffered by the company due to their fault or negligence, subject to the applicable statutory defence.
In particular, under Article 97 paragraph (5), directors may avoid personal liability for the company’s losses if they can establish that: (i) the losses were not attributable to their fault or negligence; (ii) they managed the company in good faith and with due care, in the company’s interests and in accordance with its purposes and objectives; (iii) they had no direct or indirect conflict of interest in the relevant management actions; and (iv) they took measures to prevent the occurrence or continuation of the losses.
Importantly, the regulatory standard under Article 3 paragraph (2) of POJK 17/2026 and the directors’ duties under Article 97 of the Company Law constitute two separate legal assessments. Compliance with POJK 17/2026 may be relevant when assessing directors’ conduct, but it does not automatically establish that they have fulfilled their corporate duties. Conversely, a deviation from the Business Plan does not automatically constitute a breach of directors’ duties or give rise to personal liability.
For example, a bank may fail to achieve a business target due to adverse market conditions despite having conducted appropriate assessments and taken reasonable corrective measures. Such circumstances may require an explanation to OJK, but do not necessarily indicate negligence by its directors. The assessment of liability must instead consider the circumstances surrounding the relevant decisions, the information available at the time and whether the directors acted in good faith and with due care and responsibility.
This Company Law analysis applies to banks established as Indonesian PT. However, POJK 17/2026 also covers foreign bank branch offices (Kantor Cabang dari Bank yang Berkedudukan di Luar Negeri or “KCBLN”), for which the relevant management and supervisory functions are structured differently. Accordingly, the allocation of responsibilities and the applicable liability framework for KCBLN must be assessed separately, taking into account their specific legal and organisational structure.
Governance, Oversight and Accountability
POJK 17/2026 also reinforces the respective responsibilities of the bank’s management and supervisory bodies. Under Article 2 paragraph (4), the Board of Directors prepares the Business Plan for approval by the Board of Commissioners, while Article 4 requires the Board of Commissioners to supervise its implementation. For Sharia banks, the Sharia Supervisory Board must also provide its opinion in accordance with Article 2 paragraph (5).
These responsibilities are further reflected in the reporting requirements under Articles 25 and 26. Banks must submit quarterly Business Plan Realisation Reports, while the Board of Commissioners must prepare semi-annual Business Plan Supervision Reports. The former must include actual performance against planned targets, explanations for deviations and corrective measures taken or proposed. The latter must include the Board of Commissioners’ analysis and assessment of the Board of Directors’ implementation of the Business Plan, together with the supervisory measures taken or proposed.
Beyond regulatory reporting, these documents may provide a contemporaneous record of the decisions taken by the Board of Directors and the supervisory measures exercised by the Board of Commissioners. They may therefore become relevant when OJK assesses regulatory compliance or when the conduct of the relevant individuals is subsequently examined.
Nevertheless, the existence of compliant reports does not conclusively establish that the relevant parties have discharged their duties. Equally, a reported deviation does not automatically establish negligence. The substance of the reports and the actual decision-making and corrective processes remain essential to the assessment.
Failure to comply with the relevant requirements may also expose banks to administrative sanctions under Article 5 of POJK 17/2026. Furthermore, where the bank has been subjected to the relevant administrative sanctions, members of the Board of Directors, Board of Commissioners and/or Sharia Supervisory Board may also be subject to an administrative sanction in the form of a prohibition on acting as a principal party, in accordance with the applicable OJK reassessment framework.
Flexibility and Transitional Considerations
POJK 17/2026 allows banks to amend their Business Plans once, no later than 30 June of the relevant year, where internal or external factors significantly affect their operational activities and/or performance. The amendment may be implemented no earlier than 20 business days after its submission to OJK. This mechanism provides flexibility to respond to material developments while maintaining regulatory oversight.
Banks should also consider Article 34, which preserves the implementing provisions issued under POJK 5/POJK.03/2016 to the extent that they are not inconsistent with POJK 17/2026. Accordingly, banks should assess the continued applicability of relevant provisions, including SEOJK No. 25/SEOJK.03/2016, rather than assuming that all previous implementing provisions have automatically ceased to apply.
Under Articles 32 and 33, the new framework first applies to the 2028 Business Plan, including the relevant quarterly Business Plan Realisation Reports and semi-annual Business Plan Supervision Reports. The 2027 Business Plan and its related reporting obligations remain subject to the previous framework under POJK 5/POJK.03/2016.
Conclusion
POJK 17/2026 reinforces the importance of Business Planning as part of a bank’s governance framework. However, a deviation from an approved Business Plan should not, by itself, determine whether directors have breached their duties or incurred personal liability. The relevant assessment must consider the circumstances behind the deviation, the decisions taken in response and whether the responsible parties have properly discharged their respective responsibilities.
Ultimately, effective Business Planning requires more than achieving predetermined targets. It requires sound decision-making, meaningful oversight and a documented basis for the actions taken throughout the Business Planning cycle.
For further information or consultation, please contact:
Martino Tando
Partner
Beatrice Ariesty Graciella
Associate



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